Burma may be small, but it has withstood the longest ongoing civil war in the history of the modern world. Since its independence from Great Britain in 1948, the Burma National Army (BNA) has been engaged in battle with various internal ethnic minorities. Today, there are 16 major armed groups in Burma, most notably the Karen National Liberation Army and the Shan State Army, each of which represents an ethnic minority. The roots of this six-decade conflict, however, can be traced beyond specific ethnic conflicts back to the inception of the nation, when the military became an entrenched and overpowering institution in Burmese political affairs.
In the 1940s, Aung San, a Burmese man inspired by the nationalist fever of Imperial Japan, wanted to replicate its system in his home country. Aung San and 30 other comrades trained in Japan in 1940 during World War II and later returned to Burma to form the Burma Independence Army (BIA). In 1942, the BIA — primarily drawn from the majority Burmese ethnic group — and Japanese forces launched an offensive against the country’s British colonizers. Importantly, the British forces contained a number of recruits from the minority ethnic groups in the country, who protested rule by the ethnic majority. After the BIA and Japanese army successfully overthrew the British, the BIA became the BNA, and the Japanese took charge alongside them. Minority ethnic groups deeply resented their new rulers, a sentiment ethnically Burmese politicians capitalized on to brand these minority groups as “collaborators” with the British. While at first the BNA’s and Japan’s political interests aligned, the agreement was not fated to last. In 1945, Aung San forged a partnership with Allied forces to overcome Japan’s obstruction of Burmese independence. By the time the British were back in Burma, Aung San had become General of the BNA and was venerated across the country for his efforts in the war.
At the time of Burma’s struggle for independence, 131 minority ethnicities constituted 40 percent of the population. These minority groups inhabited the peripheral regions of the country, whereas the ethnic Burmese occupied the central and coastal parts of the nation. Aung San’s push for independence drew concern from minority ethnic groups like the Karens; they feared that Aung San’s Burmese government would become “internal colonizers,” quashing the concerns of the minority ethnic groups. As one Karen leader said, “We are going to be passed from one colonial leader to another.” Because of this, a year before Burma’s official independence in 1947, the Karens unilaterally declared independence and proclaimed Kawthoolei — a southeastern sliver of the country — as the nation of the Karens.
That same year, Aung San assembled a historic conference that was attended by the major ethnic leaders of the country and that produced the Panglong Agreement. This document promised a federal union for Burma and asked in return for ethnic minorities to pledge allegiance to the new nation. In an unexpected turn of events, six months before formal independence from Great Britain in 1948, Aung San and his cabinet leaders were killed by political opportunists with connections to the British. Afterwards, a new nationalist government rose to power and reneged on the promises that Aung San had made, pushing Burma to the brink of war just a year later. The Communist Party of Burma and the Karen National Liberation Army rebelled, making huge territorial gains and leaving human destruction in their wake. The total casualties are still unclear, but the first two years of fighting saw at least 60,000 deaths.
It was during the ’50s that the current political system was crafted. During that decade, Burma’s army under General U Ne Win slowly regained much of the territory it had lost to the Karens. Despite the army’s efforts, armed minority ethnic groups maintained a stronghold in the periphery of the country. While civilian portions of the government saw compromise as the solution — Burmese Prime Minister U Nu even began to take steps towards federalism — the military was not so quick to relinquish its stronghold on civil affairs. As a result, Ne Win launched a coup in 1962, taking over the Burmese government in order to continue his oppressive campaign. Ne Win also cracked down on minority ethnic groups’ activities, arresting ethnic leaders across the country. This coup marked the beginning of 49 years of military rule and the heavy entrenchment of the military in politics. Ne Win’s plot laid the groundwork for every future iteration of Burmese government and set an important precedent: The military’s motives, at least as defined by its top generals, came first.
In the name of unity, Ne Win installed a socialist regime headed by the Burma Socialist Programme Party that lasted two and a half decades until its overthrow in 1988. Envisioning a nation based on “one ethnicity, one language, one religion,” he repealed laws that guaranteed rights to the country’s religious and ethnic minorities in a process that ethnic peoples refer to as “Burmanization” — or forced assimilation. These communities faced two choices: accept the assimilation or take up arms. Many chose the latter. Every major ethnic group created militias in response to the crisis, with over 30 ethnic armed militias operating throughout the country. Insurgency quickly became a way of life for the ethnic peoples of Burma.
The rise of these armed groups only bolstered the army’s dedication to supposed national security. Ne Win saw the army as the nation’s vanguard organization, essential to economic, social and political affairs and to protecting the country from enemies both foreign and domestic. He sought to imbue the state institutions with his militant and nationalist ideology — and succeeded by merging the military and the government entirely. This culminated in the suspension of the country’s constitution and the dissolution of its legislative branch, with Ne Win ruling entirely through executive and military power.
Through the militarization of the state, Ne Win aimed to destroy the ethnic armed militias. To this end, he launched the Four Cuts policy: cut food, cut sources of revenue, cut intelligence sources and cut recruits. His tactics were devastating both to the fighting members of armed ethnic groups and to the country’s civilians overall. The War Office ordered the execution of anyone, including children, who was suspected to be an insurgent. Entire villages were marked as free-fire zones where civilians outside designated areas were shot. In response to the immense brutality, ethnic armed groups refused to negotiate with the military.
In 1988, a democratic government toppled Ne Win’s socialist regime. This event, called the 8888 Uprising, led to thousands of deaths in the ensuing violence, but it did force Ne Win out of office. In his resignation speech, Ne Win warned: “When the military shoots, it doesn’t shoot in the air. It shoots straight.” True to his prediction, a new military government, consisting mostly of Ne Win’s loyal officers, launched a coup, claiming that pro-democracy protestors were disintegrating the nation and that it was the military’s duty to unify the country. The military shot straight into the protestors, killing nearly 3,000 people.
Although the democratic uprising did not succeed, it gave rise to an icon: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a popular opposition politician. As a concession to her wide following, the military allowed for democratic elections in 1990. Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy, won by a landslide. Nevertheless, the military prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from taking office — placing her under house arrest for 15 of the next 20 years — and the elected parliament was forbidden to assemble. Now under the thumb of Senior General Than Shwe and his State Law and Order Restoration Council, the country’s name changed to Myanmar in a political maneuver meant to eschew the country’s colonial past. The cosmetic changes in name and government made little difference in terms of violence: Tensions with the ethnic armed groups remained, the Four Cuts policy stayed in place and the war continued.
Recent years have seen rare flickers of hope in response to fiery public protest. In 2009, the Burmese government ratified a new constitution. Two years later, top military leaders stepped down, paving the way for a civilian government to come to power. Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. Thousands of political prisoners were freed. Restrictions on free speech and press were relaxed. And for the first time, the topic of a federal union — one that minority ethnic groups have been demanding for decades — would be on the agenda for peace negotiations.
However, the new government is not genuinely democratic, and the military establishment has retained many of the privileges it secured for itself over the past 60 years. The new president, U Thein Sein, is a former general and was prime minister under the previous military government. Clear favoritism is still shown towards the military: Soldiers and officers maintain immunity for past crimes, reserve leadership over defense, home and border affairs and are guaranteed 25 percent of seats in parliament, meaning the military party has the power to dismiss the government in the case of a national emergency. These embedded constitutional powers are especially problematic today: They show that the military has not truly acceded to democratic forces and, though lurking in the background, still controls most of the crucial aspects of governance.
Despite these authoritarian policies, the peace process has continued. After signing peace agreements with 16 individual ethnic armed groups, the government is now working towards a nationwide cease-fire agreement, which would set the framework for the end of the armed conflict, along with increased political dialogue and a new constitutional convention. These promises, however, are undermined by the government’s continued attacks against ethnic minority militias. During the early days of the peace effort, the military broke a ceasefire with the Kachin Independence Army and waged offensives against the Shan State and the Karen National Union. The secretary general of the New Mon State Party remarked, “The president wrote to the army [to stop attacking], but the army did not obey…You can see that the government cannot be influential over the army.” He was right. Old habits die hard, and the Burmese military still has a mind and agenda of its own.
Demilitarizing the government will be difficult, if not impossible. Even the president does not have complete control over the state’s actions, as the military has operated for half a century with an ingrained sense of absolute authority. Although the democratic transition and signing of cease-fire agreements in 2011 raised hopes for peace, the military is unlikely to cordially accept a great reduction in its power. But the lives of millions hinge on finding a way to do this. The military’s entrenched role in government must be dismantled for any hope of national stability and peace in the future.
Art by Amanda Googe.