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Still Waiting to #BringBackOurGirls

Tuesday, October 14 marked six months from the date a group of nearly 300 schoolgirls in northeastern Nigeria was kidnapped by the Muslim extremist group Boko Haram. The kidnapping prompted a flurry of social media uproar, notably the #BringBackOurGirls campaign, championed by teens and celebrities alike. Secretary of State John Kerry described the situation as “not just an act of terrorism. It’s a massive human trafficking moment and grotesque.” Yet as the six-month mark comes to pass, it prompts reflection on the progress — or lack thereof — of the initiative to find and rescue the girls. Why has the Nigerian government failed to make significant headway? And what role should the United States play? A look at the geopolitical conditions within Nigeria reveals that structural problems have exacerbated religious and economic divisions in the country, rendering the government increasingly ineffective. Yet despite these pervasive and crippling issues, a US intervention risks doing more harm than good.

Since 1999, Nigeria’s “constituent states have been permitted to institute Islamic law as the basis of local civil and criminal court procedures.” This policy has resulted in all 12 northern states adopting Islamic law (often called “Sharia law”), while the country’s southern states — which are predominantly Christian — elected to remain without it. The root of this segregation can be traced back to British colonialism. Modern Nigeria is a product of the merging of two British colonial territories in 1914. The northern territory was originally the center of an Islamic empire called the Sokoto Caliphate, while “the major sociopolitical influences [on the Southern territory] were Western and traditional Africa.” The merge was prompted by British colonizers’ economic and political motivations; however, we see that there have been lasting implications from the unnatural union.

The religious divide directly translates into a political one. In the 2011 election, for example, Christian southerner Goodluck Jonathan soundly defeated his Muslim opponent, Muhammadu Buhari, and the election results demonstrated the division within the country: Jonathan was backed by 95 percent of the predominantly Christian states in the south, while his Muslim opponent was favored by every state in the north under Sharia law. In turn, it seems that Jonathan’s election has served to exacerbate religious tensions.

Fear and tension between Muslims and Christians dates back to colonial times. Each group holds deeply rooted anxieties about losing influence in the country’s political arena: Christians fear that politically dominant Muslims might “use their privileged perch to Islamize national institutions,” while Muslims push back against what they see as “unbridled Westernization.”

This instability and tension has fostered an environment in which groups like Boko Haram can gain traction. Especially as economic problems persist in the country, Nigerian politics have grown increasingly polarized, and politicians’ religious rhetoric increasingly points fingers at members of the opposing religious community. This growing political polarization has “deepened social fissures and spawned extremist and violent insurgencies.” As a result, the government is lacking the comprehensive support it needs to establish an effective and cohesive campaign against Boko Haram. Its heavy-handed approach to combatting the extremist group fails to “address the concerns of [citizens] who might support Boko Haram” and thereby loses the support of these groups — largely Muslims who feel marginalized. As a result, the government is crippled in its ability to gain regional support and leverage human intelligence.

Corruption adds to the complexity of the problems impeding government effectiveness on the issue. It exists on an institutional level, manifested in “bad roads, intermittent to nonsexist power supply, ill-maintained infrastructures…embezzlement of funds by public officials…politically sponsored ethnic violence…” Many argue that existing policies encourage the marginalization of social groups, and the president, Goodluck Jonathan, lacks an “understanding of the political, social, historical and ethnic climate that has defined the Nigerian society.” There is a fundamental lack of cohesive support across the country for government measures, which in this circumstance makes it difficult for the government to leverage the population in order to wage an effective campaign against Boko Haram.

The kidnapping of the schoolgirls and the systemic problems that persist in the country are disturbing and troubling. As more time passes without results, the United States may feel pressure to intervene itself. While this is an instinctually ethical move, the effort would not be politically sound. A military intervention would consist of waging a counterinsurgency, an extremely difficult military maneuver — and one we’ve not had a good track record with in the past. Its success largely depends on winning over the local population: “so if you’re a foreign power, basically occupying a foreign country will breed resentment and ultimately be counter-productive.” In light of Nigeria’s troubled colonial history, US military intervention could prove ineffective and “actually strengthen Boko Haram’s stranglehold on the region.”

What’s more, the impediments to effective and comprehensive action are rooted in the geopolitical problems that have produced religious and social divide in Nigeria. These issues date back to British colonialism. British colonial law of “indirect rule” created the basis for using religious and ethnic divides as the markers of identity in the political realm, and there needs to be a shift away from religion and ethnicity as part of the political playing field in order to effect change. US intervention does little to address the nature of the problems that have enabled groups like Boko Haram.

So what is the solution? There is no simple answer; the solution to this problem is especially not one that can be accomplished by an external force. Perhaps Nigeria needs a new constitution to define the privileges of citizenship and distribute resources “in terms of residency rather than nativism, ancestry, and religion.” This change could have social and economic implications, lessening the use of religious and ethnic rhetoric in the political realm and establishing the foundation for more equitable distribution of resources across the country. The United States should continue with the supplemental assistance programs it has established — listed in a White House bulletin as ranging from a “multi-disciplinary advising team,” intelligence sharing, technical training and equipment and development of the USAID program to promote women’s education.

On October 16, the Nigerian government announced that an agreement had been reached between the administration and Boko Haram that could prove to lead to the release of the schoolgirls. There are still serious doubts about the credibility of this agreement and whether Boko Haram will honor the agreement at all, but all we can do is hope for improvement and that the progression of these positive developments will #BringBackOurGirls.

About the Author

Lydia Davenport '16 is a political science concentrator and a staff writer at BPR.

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