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Closing Up Shop: Dealing with Terrorism

On August 19, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a terrorist group, released a graphic video that depicted the beheading of the American journalist James Foley. The following morning President Obama delivered a speech from Martha’s Vineyard, where he had been on vacation the previous week, in which he vowed to “be relentless” against the Islamic radical group.

ISIS’s alarming video accomplishes its goal of inciting fear and anger in viewers, or anyone that comes across the heavily circulated video stills of James Foley on his knees in an orange jumpsuit. Unsettled, the American public looked to Obama in this time of crisis for answers and assurance that justice would be served. Many were troubled by the seeming inconsistency between Obama’s claim that he was “appalled” and “heartbroken” in his speech and the facility with which he stepped off the podium and picked up his golf clubs. Although it may not be the reaction one would want from the president, both history and statistics suggest that taking a unwavering stance when dealing with terrorist threats is the most effective policy; both the president’s emotional signaling and the rules on terrorist negotiations should remain firm and consistent. Despite the callousness of resuming his vacation, the emotional detachment that Obama displayed in the face of terrorism is actually the right response.

The United States has a particularly rigid policy when it comes to working with terrorists. Simply, we don’t; the main tenet of which is our refusal to pay ransom money. While most countries have official policies of not paying ransoms, they often end up doing so by unofficial means, leaving the US and UK alone among EU members as countries that consistently do not pay ransom money to terrorist organizations. In the case of James Foley’s kidnapping, ISIS demanded “$132.5 million and political concessions from Washington.” After getting neither, they filmed Foley being beheaded. It is clear that our hardline policy of refusing to pay ransoms has the undeniable consequence of putting kidnapped American citizens at a disadvantage. Earlier this year, two Spanish and four French hostages kidnapped by terrorist groups were released after “their governments paid ransoms through intermediaries.”

This being said, governments who agree to pay ransom money are effectively funding terrorist organizations and in doing so, are perpetuating their activity and influence. Since 2008, “al-Qaeda and its affiliates have received at least $125 million in ransom money from kidnappings.” At the same time, the average ransom amount demanded has increased steeply over time, from an average of $200,000 in 2003 to millions of dollars today.

What’s more, if we consider the statistics, it is clear that there is a correlation between a country’s ransom policy and the frequency with which it is targeted by terrorists. France, for example, is a country that officially does not support paying ransom money but nonetheless often allows funds to be “funneled through to the employer of the hostage, who is then responsible for the payment.” A recent study shows that since 2008, France has paid the most ransoms of any country, and that last year, the majority of hostages taken around the world were French. These statistics show that maintaining an unwavering stance on hostage negotiations serves to deter terrorists groups from kidnapping American citizens, while a less consistent, softer approach results in higher risk of targeting by terrorist groups.

In addition, there are historical lessons that suggest that Obama’s public, emotional signaling is the most effective prong of our hardline approach to terrorist crises. Notably, President Carter’s handling of the Iranian hostage crisis can be used as a foil to Obama’s handling of the ISIS threat. In 1979, a group of Iranian students overran the US embassy and took 66 people hostage. The event was the culmination of the growing resentment towards the United States in the midst of the Iranian Revolution, the catalyst for which was President Carter’s decision to allow the exiled Shah, “a pro-Western autocrat,” into America to receive treatment for his cancer. After the seizure of the embassy, Carter made freeing the hostages his “number one priority,” and initially earned the support and praise of the American people for his dedication. Yet despite his commitment and dedication, both Carter’s diplomatic and economic efforts “had no discernible effect” in bringing about any resolution.

Furthermore, Carter’s all-encompassing emotional investment contributed to his ineffectiveness and failure to bring about a resolution. Six months after the initial crisis, under immense pressure to take action and feeling incapable without having yet achieved a resolution, Carter authorized a high-risk operation called Desert One. The mission was a failure and had to be aborted, an occurrence that further contributed to the appearance of American weakness. One could argue that Carter’s public personal investment compromised his ability to create effective policy and navigate the crisis successfully.

That the hostages were released only hours after Reagan was inaugurated further supports the idea that Carter himself specifically contributed to the failure to bring about a resolution. Carter advisor Peter Bourne later said, “Because people felt that Carter had not been tough enough in foreign policy, this kind of symbolized for them that some bunch of students could seize American diplomatic officials…and thumb their nose at the United States.” Arguably a large facet of Carter’s weakness was his evident emotional distress; despite it being the response we as a people were looking for, it contributed to his failure and to Khomeini’s lack of respect for him or willingness to compromise.

Obama’s handling of the ISIS threat and the James Foley video demonstrates a much more effective response to terrorist crises. While Obama’s decision to promptly resume his vacation sparked criticism of callousness in the face of tragedy, we should keep in mind Carter’s handling of the Iranian hostage crisis when we assess whether Obama’s response has been appropriate and strategic. Obama’s ability to remain cool and somewhat removed from the event is, in a sense, a reassurance that the administration is equipped to implement strategy and policy in response to terrorist action. What’s more, this unwavering signaling is an important facet of our overall hardline approach to dealing with terrorists and reaffirms our commitment to refusing to negotiate. In sum, despite receiving criticism, Obama’s handling of the ISIS threat is positive reinforcement of US policy, which has been proven to be the most effective response to terrorist threats. The measured calmness with which Obama has handled this crisis will allow him to execute a reasonable and well-calculated strategy that will hopefully prove to bring about further development and closure regarding the ISIS threat.

About the Author

Lydia Davenport '16 is a political science concentrator and a staff writer at BPR.

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