The Limits of Nuclear Deterrence: An Interview with Professor Reid Pauly

The Limits of Nuclear Deterrence: An Interview with Professor Reid Pauly
Image Courtesy of Reid Pauly

Reid Pauly is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and the Dean’s Assistant Professor of Nuclear Security and Policy at Brown University’s Watson School of International and Public Affairs. His research focuses on nuclear proliferation, nuclear strategy, coercion, deterrence, and wargaming. In particular, he examines how states use threats and assurances to influence adversaries, manage international crises, and prevent conflict. He is the author of The Art of Coercion: Credible Threats and the Assurance Dilemma (2025), which explores why coercive diplomacy often fails and the importance of credible assurances in international negotiations. His research has been published in International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, and the European Journal of International Relations. He previously held fellowships at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a BA in Government and History from Cornell University.

Mariia Brailovska: How has the global nuclear landscape changed over the past few decades, and how have these recent advances affected the risk of nuclear war?

Reid Pauly: If you look at the history of nuclear proliferation, there has been a fairly consistent but slow trend towards a new state acquiring nuclear weapons every five to ten years. The fact that there are only nine nuclear-armed countries in the world today—despite the fact that nuclear technology dates back to the 1940s—is a testament to the success of the cooperative nonproliferation regime. So, it is both a cooperative regime, with things like the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) at its core, and one enforced—sometimes selectively—by great powers.

For a time, it looked like we had reached a status quo where a lot of the hard problems had been dealt with, and we were down to two big issues: North Korea and Iran. One of those ended up in the “failure” column. North Korea has nuclear weapons, and it doesn’t look like denuclearization is going to happen anytime soon. The other ended up in the “success” column, as there was a coercive bargain that Iran accepted to stop short of acquiring nuclear weapons. Now, the current war is making Iran look a lot less like a success.

One major tool of nuclear nonproliferation has been American extended deterrence: the pledge that the United States would use its nuclear weapons in defense of its allies. Therefore, those countries wouldn’t need their own nuclear arsenals. Now we’re looking at a future where it’s not just rogue states with suspicious nuclear intentions that we’re worried about, but also strong economies and US allies, like South Korea. It’s not new for the United States to worry about its allies acquiring nuclear weapons, but the challenge for the future of the nonproliferation regime is how to continue its success in an era when some of the great powers that used to enforce it have diminished toolkits.

MB: Under what conditions could current conflicts escalate into nuclear war?

RP: The most likely pathway to the use of nuclear weapons throughout most of the nuclear age has been a conventional war that gets out of hand, rather than a bolt-out-of-the-blue strike designed to get the jump on another nuclear-armed state and destroy all of its weapons. It is more likely that a conventional war goes badly enough for a nuclear-armed government that it decides that nuclear force is going to make up for its conventional military failures. That was the fear of Russian nuclear use in Ukraine, particularly in the fall of 2022.

Another pathway to nuclear war is inadvertent escalation. A nuclear war could begin if, in the course of fighting a conventional war, one side begins hitting military targets that serve both nuclear and conventional purposes. This could send political signals to the other side that—even though one country believes it is fighting a conventional war—its opponent might interpret those actions as preparation for a nuclear conflict. Entangled command-and-control nodes and communication systems used to coordinate conventional forces could be the very same networks required to transmit orders to launch nuclear weapons. This is a major concern in a potential war between the United States and China, where considerable entanglement between nuclear and conventional targets could make it more difficult to control escalation.

MB: A couple of months ago, Russia used missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, although they were not equipped with nuclear warheads. This raised concerns about the possibility of nuclear escalation.

RP: There were at least two instances of concern about inadvertent escalation in Ukraine. The first was Ukraine’s targeting of Russian early-warning radars, which are also part of Russia’s nuclear command-and-control system. Degrading the early-warning capabilities of a nuclear-armed state could make it prone to more hasty decisions. 

The second was Russia’s use of the Oreshnik intermediate-range missile, which can carry a nuclear warhead. Although it carried a conventional warhead, its use appeared to signal Russia’s willingness to escalate the conflict further. The risk of inadvertent escalation lies in the fact that once a missile is launched, you cannot know whether it carries a nuclear or conventional payload until it reaches its destination.

MB: How effective are deterrence and diplomacy in preventing nuclear conflict today? What other measures could help reduce the risk of escalation?

RP: Nuclear deterrence has helped preserve peace throughout the nuclear age. The prospect of nuclear war gives leaders pause and makes them more cautious about starting a war in the first place. However, this deterrent effect is not cost-free and comes with certain risks. Avoiding nuclear war has sometimes required a degree of luck. 

We cannot rely on nuclear deterrence alone. There is plenty of violence in the nuclear age that deterrence has failed to prevent, much of it unrelated to the risk of nuclear escalation. We need to be clear-eyed about what nuclear weapons can and cannot accomplish. Nuclear deterrence can never replace diplomacy; deterrence operates in the background, hopefully preventing the worst outcomes. A more peaceful world depends on improving communication between governments that distrust or oppose one another, building agreement, and preventing states from turning to violence to resolve perceived security threats.

Claire Zhong: I listened to a little bit of your podcast with the Watson School of International and Public Affairs, and one thing that really stuck out to me was how you described Iran’s nuclear program as “buried,” both in infrastructure and also in their capabilities. And I was wondering if you could expand a little bit more about how the war has changed Iran’s nuclear incentives.

RP: I describe it as “buried” because it is both literally buried in the sense that large munitions were used to collapse tunnels and destroy underground facilities, and because Iran’s nuclear intentions are also now much more opaque. 

The prime example of this is that somewhere in Iran, there are about 1,000 pounds of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, which is very close to being weapons-grade uranium. It is literally buried somewhere. We know it exists because the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) used to go in and weigh it and ensure that we knew exactly where it was. But after the war started, Iran kicked out the IAEA, so nobody is providing that level of transparency over what Iran is doing with this material and even where it is.

This is not good because of the second way in which I was trying to use the term “buried,” which is that it is really hard to know what the status of the program is once you’ve kicked out international inspectors. You are relying on intelligence to monitor Iran’s nuclear intentions.

Now to the political effects. The war has made it more, not less likely that a future government of Iran will decide to sprint for the bomb. Before the war started, Iran had clearly made the choice that it wanted to hedge: to acquire the capability to build nuclear weapons if it chose to, but also explicitly not to take the last step and authorize their construction.

Most of them are being quiet about their nuclear intentions for—I think—understandable reasons. But it’s not hard to guess that the new hardline government thinks hedging was the wrong strategy or that what Iran did wrong before the war was to not build nuclear weapons fast enough, because that maybe would have deterred the United States and Israel from attacking.

That said, I don’t expect this Iranian government to sprint for nuclear weapons immediately because that is a high-risk strategy. I expect them to wait for an opportune moment. They are going to want to pick a moment when their adversaries have lost their appetite for war.

CZ: Do you think this carries any specific implications in terms of regional security?

RP: There has always (rightly) been a fear that if Iran got nuclear weapons, there might be a proliferation cascade in the region—that Saudi Arabia might want to follow. That’s why a US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement was so controversial earlier this year.

But more broadly, the region is in flux. Israel and the United States attempted regime change in Iran, but it did not go as expected. Instead, the war gave Iran some new sources of power, like a demonstrated capacity to cut off traffic through a critical waterway that feeds oil to the global economy.

So, it is quite unclear what the new order in the Middle East will look like. To even begin that conversation, you need to have a sense of where the relative power lies in this new environment, and that in itself is not clear.

CZ: Is this an issue where Iranians feel like even if they comply with what the United States is asking of them,  they’re still in danger of being attacked?

RP: I think that’s the right interpretation. The United States has, for a long time, been attempting to coerce Iran—both with sanctions and the threat of military punishment—to make concessions on its nuclear program and to accept limits that are acceptable to us, in a verifiable way.

And we have, I think, pretty clear evidence that the Iranian government perceives those threats to be both credible and severe. Yet, it is unwilling to make concessions today. That is because Iran does not think that if it makes concessions, it will actually be able to avoid the pain of either economic or military coercion.

I’m also not that pessimistic because I think that a leader after President Trump might be able to put back together enough pieces of a successful coercive diplomacy strategy to try and communicate that Iran can actually find safety and compliance. It’s at least worth it to keep trying. Nuclear nonproliferation has never been an easy business. 

*This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

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