Skip Navigation

Making A Deal With Iran

Last month, a group of nations led by the United States agreed to extend important negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program. As the diplomats worked for peace, Congress once again beat the drums of war. A bloc led by Senators Robert Menendez of New Jersey and Mark Kirk of Illinois pushed for additional economic sanctions on Iran and actively sought to disrupt the talks to avoid what they feel would be dire consequences. The two Senators and their allies, along with many influential Israeli politicians, insisted that a nuclear-armed Iran would be a major international security risk, that the leadership in Iran will never compromise and that somehow maintaining a dated, adversarial relationship with Iran is in the best interests of the United States. These analysts could not be more wrong.

A deal allowing Iran to maintain a nuclear capacity will make Iran feel more secure in its geographic position surrounded by rivals, which will increase the likelihood that it will cooperate with other actors in the region. This is crucial because Iran actually shares strategic goals with Washington, and has shown willingness in the past to work with the US government to reach those objectives. Additionally, its widely pro-American populace has indicated its desire for Iran to integrate with the global community by electing a moderate president last year, not to mention its general resistance to extremism of any sort. Simply put, a deal within the new seven-month timeframe would be the biggest breakthrough in American-Middle Eastern relations since the 1979 Camp David Accords.

It is important to understand Iran’s perspective when analyzing its foreign policy. Iran is, first and foremost, a classic example of a neorealist state. It is concerned primarily for its own security, which is understandable given its difficult geopolitical position. Iran has confronted virtually all of its neighbors at one time or another. Directly across the Persian Gulf lies Saudi Arabia, ruled by a Sunni monarchy that places it at odds with Iran’s Shia leadership. The additional Sunni monarchy in Bahrain, right next door, basically functions as a Saudi proxy state. To add insult to injury, the United States Fifth Fleet, the same organization that shot down an Iranian passenger airliner in 1988, is based in the tiny nation.

Iran also faces security threats elsewhere, and its efforts to combat them are completely rational. Though since 2006 the government in Iraq has been somewhat friendly, the history between the two nations is contentious, and the rapid growth of radical Sunni cell ISIS is a direct threat to Iranian interests. With this in mind, its ally Hezbollah is actively working to ensure additional hostile Sunni states do not develop in Syria and Lebanon, and its recent interference on the side of the Shia Houthis in Yemen connote its desire to check Saudi influence on the Arabian Peninsula. None of these activities are irrational, religiously motivated, or contrary to what any other state would do in the same circumstance; the fact that Iran frequently sides with Shia groups is primarily a function of geopolitics, not ideology, as evidenced by its alliance with Hamas, a Sunni party.

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities is another such move for security. Fears of a strike on Israel are unfounded, as the consequences of a preemptive attack would be dire for Iran. Similarly, Iran would never be tempted to hand off control of a nuclear weapon to a non-state actor. There is no precedent for such a move, and giving up control of the deterrent negates its purpose altogether. As for the alleged threat of a regional arms race, all of Iran’s influential neighbors have powerful incentives not to develop weapons themselves. Turkey is a member of NATO, Egypt has a military partnership with the United States that would be endangered by a nuclear push, and Saudi Arabia would threaten both its overt American and covert Israeli relationships by attempting the same thing.

If Iran and the Western powers are able to come to terms on a deal, perhaps limiting Iran’s so-called “breakout” capacity while allowing its nuclear program to exist and decreasing economic sanctions, there is evidence that Iran could become an invaluable ally. Time and time again its leadership has shown a desire to collaborate with the United States. The Iranian defense department played a supporting role in the initial American pursuit of Taliban insurgents in the wake of 9/11, and in 2003 Iran reached out to the United States with a comprehensive agreement to limit its nuclear program in return for sanctions relief and a security partnership. The former cooperation ended in the wake of President Bush’s famous speech in which he included Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil.” The latter was completely ignored by the administration for no obvious reason.

Even after eight years of right-wing rule under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian people have sent the message that they want to engage with the West. The Green Revolution of 2009 and the election of moderate President Hassan Rouhani four years later showcase the prevailing liberalism on the streets of Iran. Hardliners in the government, along with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, are making it difficult for these movements to gain any headway, and their bellicose rhetoric towards the West and Israel (though, as shown before, not backed by any action at all) is a big reason for the intense stigma towards Iran in those places. Practically speaking, though, they have not served as any more of an impediment to a nuclear agreement than Republicans in the US Congress. There is reason to believe they would agree to a reasonable deal. Regarding American hardliners, things are far less certain.

The world as a whole should hope that in these seven months, they change their minds. A fair settlement is in the best interests of everyone. Reaching this goal assuages Iran’s security fears, giving it no reason to become aggressive, though there is scant evidence that it would. It opens the door for Iran and the United States to work together against extremism in the region, a door that the latter has stupidly slammed shut twice before. It might help to avoid a geopolitical showdown that will inevitably take on misleading sectarian overtones. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it will end a needless political rivalry based on an incident that took place 35 years ago. It is, at long last, time to cast aside archaic prejudices and stubborn fears, and to face this situation objectively.

About the Author

Matthew Jarrell '18 is an International Relations concentrator and Associate Content Director of the Brown Political Review.

SUGGESTED ARTICLES