On September 18, the day of Scotland’s referendum, it was not just the Scottish that held their breath — panicked Westminster politicians, stakeholders across Europe and curious onlookers around the world also awaited the verdict. Reporters commented on the throngs of foreigners who had flooded into Scotland to support the nationalist movement. Coming from separatist regions like Italy’s Sardinia and Spain’s Catalonia, Belgium’s Flanders and the United Kingdom’s own Northern Ireland, they paraded alongside Scottish flags and Union Jacks on the streets of Edinburgh. Ultimately the referendum failed — 55 percent of Scots voted to stay in the UK — but debate about the relationship between regions, states and the European Union has kept its fire. The growing desire for regional autonomy within the EU may not lead to a proliferation of new states, but it is likely to decentralize the current ones.
While members of various European pro-independence movements were campaigning for the Scottish referendum, their compatriots at home were ramping up activity to capitalize on Scotland’s international spotlight. As Scotland’s tallies trickled in, the number of pro-independence tweets from Barcelona surged, Basque separatists in Spain increased their activity and the right-wing Lega Nord (Northern League) party in Italy, which vociferously supports the secession of Italy’s Veneto region, was on high alert. None of these groups have been afforded the same opportunity to secure their independence as Scotland’s movement has, but the newly increased international attention on secessionism could help them advance their agendas. A referendum on whether Catalonia should become independent from Spain was scheduled for November 9 and had even been confirmed by the regional president, but the vote has since been ruled unconstitutional after the Spanish president intervened. In Veneto, an unofficial independence referendum in March logged ballots from 75 percent of the region’s eligible voters, with 89 percent favoring independence. However, a true independence referendum would be unconstitutional under Italian law. To remedy such barriers throughout Europe, the Flemish People’s Party, a Belgian secessionist group, is pressuring the EU to amend its treaties to explicitly support self-determination. According to The Guardian’s Severin Carrell, these movements are jointly creating “pan-European momentum” to overcome ossified national politics by appealing directly to the EU’s supranational bodies.
Despite their common goal of self-determination, Scotland’s movement and others across Europe differ in their legal and cultural landscapes. To begin, Scotland, unlike Catalonia, Veneto or Flanders, is not constitutionally bound to its parent state. Further, its independence debate is seen as more balanced and constructive. Comparing the Scottish and Catalonian movements, renowned writer Javier Caceres said that “in Great Britain there is a pretty calm and rational debate…In Spain we can barely exchange anything apart from yelling, lies and personal attacks in a hysterical climate that does not exclude thuggery.” Former El País reporter Ramón Lobo similarly praised Scotland’s use of “negotiation, agreements and polls” as “something that Catalonia is missing.” Both writers hint at the fact that only 19 percent of the Catalan Parliament’s deputies support a coherent message of independence; the rest of the pro-independence majority supports only the nebulous “right to decide.”
Similarly, Veneto’s separatist movement has been derided for a lack of legitimacy. Italian weekly L’Espresso called the online referendum in March a “hoax” after discovering that one could sign up to vote with a fictitious name and cast innumerable ballots. A Le Monde correspondent in Rome, Philippe Ridet, went so far as to say that Lega Nord’s call for independence in Veneto was mere politicking with no policy implications. Speaking about the Veneto independence debate, but perhaps reflecting on Europe’s radical autonomy movements as a whole, former Economist writer Beppe Severgnini suggested that engaging with the movements in a serious way would “waste a ton of time.”
Unlike these other independence movements, Scotland never intended to gain full control over regional affairs. Instead, it only wished to reestablish Scottish agency in its own governance and finances, while ceding some powers to the EU. That desire is partly a result of Scottish politics. Scots traditionally vote for social democratic policies, placing Scotland historically in line with EU decision-making. In the context of the UK, Scots have voted liberal almost continuously since 1935, but because of the conservative majority in England, they have spent more than half that time under a conservative majority parliament in Westminster. The pro-separatist “yes” movement argued that “independence [would] give Scotland a seat at the top table and a voice when key decisions are being made about Europe’s future” — a voice that it alleged was being drowned out in London.
Although the pro-independence “yes” campaign may have lost the referendum, Scotland as a whole still emerged a winner. In response to the debates sparked by the Scottish referendum, the UK may take landmark steps to decentralize its government. A poll in early September, prior to the vote, suggested “yes” supporters outnumbered “no” supporters, sending Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron as well as leaders of the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats scrambling. Party representatives hastily met to decide on a plan of action to reverse the trend and decided to promise major policy changes if Scotland chose to stay in the UK, many of which would apply to Wales and Northern Ireland as well. In a role reversal of sorts, the English are now examining the effects of Scottish influence on their own decisions and are even debating establishing a regional English parliament parallel to that of Scotland’s. Former British politician Shirley Williams argues that such steps are paving “the way towards a federal United Kingdom,” similar to government structures in Canada, Germany and Australia. Promises of devolution of power by London could change the way the UK interacts with Europe: It could magnify the overall influence of the country in EU affairs by increasing interactions between its individual regions and EU structures.
Federalization is nothing new within the EU. The Single European Act of 1985, which helped ease the transition to a single market, coincided with the decentralization of the French government. At that point, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Spain were all taking steps towards federalization, creating directly elected local governments with clear administrative responsibilities. Jean Quatremer, from the French newspaper Libération, explained that the previous top-down approach to governance was “past its prime…and no longer corresponded to the adaptability that the modern world demanded.” As a result, EU policy has, from the beginning, taken into account the shifting power structures of its member states. This was evident as early as 1988, when the EU Structural Funds, created to reduce economic disparity between regions, began awarding funds directly to regional governments.
As the political significance and economic power of the EU has grown, subnational jurisdictions have increasingly set their sights on shaping policy. This process has been fast-tracked by the growing federalization of member states, which allows regions to represent themselves more independently with respect to both their national governments and Europe at large. Some such areas, most notably the wealthy German state of Bavaria, have long had independent missions in Brussels to lobby policy interests and secure financing from the EU. In total, cities, municipalities and regions now have around 250 missions in Brussels. South Denmark’s mission alone had $1.3 million at its disposal in 2012, and Bavaria’s mission was made up of 23 employees. These missions reflect the way some regions have sidestepped national governments by using EU structures to gain traction on key issues. In many cases, this has helped diminish regional tensions, especially regarding central government spending, which could have otherwise exacerbated separatist tendencies. If the UK shifts to a more federal model, its regional components will likely start to look past London to similarly advance their economic and legislative interests.
The failure of Scotland’s independence bid raises a lot more questions than it resolves. Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, acting as a Scottish supporter of Westminster, has promised a clear timeline for creating guarantees of autonomy for Scotland, though the process could take years. Scotland has demonstrated that the debate over autonomy can be negotiated in a constructive manner, but it is improbable that the showdowns with other European movements will proceed similarly.
The EU’s role in these conflicts is still uncertain. The organization provides an opportunity for autonomy-minded regions to influence EU policy without becoming fully independent. At the same time, the EU may be indirectly encouraging separatist movements to seek independence: The ability for the organization to intervene and resolve economic instability provides a hypothetical safety net for regions whose voters fear the economic toll of independence. However, the EU’s official structures for engaging regional aspirations are still rudimentary and unlikely to assuage enduring tensions in Catalonia, Veneto and other areas. If anything, the EU remains a partner for regions seeking a greater say in their affairs, not a replacement for central governments. But as decentralization continues to gain traction within nations, the face of European integration will need to reflect this kaleidoscopic reality. At least for now, Scotland’s citizens have demonstrated that unity — both within and among Europe’s states — is as vital as regional autonomy.
Art by Grace Sun.