The Future of Turkish Kurds

In early June, a nation-wide rallying cry for the reassertion of democracy in Turkey was sparked by Prime Minister Erdogan’s autocratic tactics: cracking down on the press, stifling legitimate political opposition, imposing building projects and most recently for restricting alcohol use and asserting stricter Islamist policy. As Turkish citizens of varying backgrounds and ideologies come together in protest against Erdogan’s authoritarian tactics, the fate of the Kurdish people in Turkey is taking new shape. Being a long-subjugated ethnic minority constituting about 20 percent of Turkey’s population, the Kurds know the ropes when it comes to protest. Some have joined in the rallies in Gezi Park, Istanbul, contributing their knowledge from decades of experience in self-defense from the Turkish government’s brutality. There have also been recent protests in the Kurdish dominated south-eastern region of Istanbul, which led to yet another instance of governmental brutality. A peaceful protest against construction of a new army outpost in the region ended with Turkish security forces firing shots into a group of protesters.

It has yet to be realized how these riots will impact future prospects for Turkish Kurds. On the one hand, there is potential for unification and collaboration with other segments of Turkish society towards an inclusive democratic system, integrating Kurdish interests. As it has become evident to the general population that Erdogan has directed media reports during the riots (i.e. the infamous penguin broadcast), the distorted representation of Kurds perpetuated by the media can be discredited, and the Kurdish efforts for equality and justice may be recognized. However, given the history of segregation, distrust, and hostility, total reconciliation will certainly be a gradual progress.

If any institutional changes come out of these series of protests, the expansion of Kurdish rights and representation is an essential one for democracy. Kurdish demands for constitutional reform recognizing their cultural, political and linguistic rights with an end to stress on ‘Turkish identity’ have yet to be fully realized. To that point, as with any large ethnic group, Kurds themselves have a range of views on their own relationship with Turkey, spanning from peaceful assimilation to violent separatist acts carried out by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Kurds are most generally represented by the BDP, who demand Kurdish political, economic and social rights within the current governing framework.

Cordial relations with the Kurdish minority is not only democratically necessitated, but also politically and economically beneficial for the Turkish nation as a whole, both in domestic and regional affairs. And despite several instances of undemocratic behavior and tendency towards radical religious policy, Erdogan does have a promising track record when it comes to the Kurdish peace. After nearly 30 years of hostile relations, a monetary cost of about 800bn lira (£290bn), 40,000 lives lost, the internal strife is on a path towards resolution. This year, Erdogan negotiated a peace plan with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. This plan started with a ceasefire in March and the initial withdrawal of PKK troops from Turkish soil in May. Additionally, Erdogan has invested billions of dollars in public projects in Kurdish territories populated areas, working towards improving economic and social hardships through building up infrastructure, transportation, agriculture, and education. Given the extended history of hostility, it’s unsurprising that the efficacy and genuine nature of Erdogan’s plans for Kurdish peace have been brought into serious question. However, these efforts and reforms are critical steps in the right direction. Protestors would be ill advised to reverse this trend of Kurdish social progress because of a reactionary resurgence of Turkish nationalism in response to Erdogan.

Capitalizing on the promises of the Kurdish peace, Turkey stands to benefit both at home – by finally making headway on Turkey’s most violent domestic conflict and improving Turkish democracy – and abroad – by securing Turkish interests in the region, especially with Kurds living in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, who will be strategic political alliances. Turkey’s ties to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, for example, will provide Turkey with important political and economic influence, that is not contingent on the Iraqi government. Part of the cease-fire between Erdogan and Ocalan entailed a relocation of PKK militants to the northern mountains of Iraq, where the KRG is already established. Even before the peace process began with the PKK, Turkey started to negotiate the deal with the KRG to create a direct pipeline to export oil to Turkey. As oil becomes the KRG’s strategic product, Turkish provision of an energy transit route will strengthen Turkish presence in the region. Turkey being increasingly distrustful of Iraq, their ties with the KRG will be essential for future political leverage.

Kurdish peace can also be expected to give Turkey an advantage in the ongoing regional rivalry with Iran. Iran has been opposed to the peace agreement with PKK leadership due to the increased threat posed by PKK’s armed wing in Iran, The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), as the PKK shifts its focus from the Turkish government. In late April, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps reportedly tried and failed to get the PKK to remain a hostile presence in Turkey, with an offer of tactical military assistance. The PKK’s rebuff of Iran’s proposition further validates the relationship established with Erdogan’s government.

The ongoing conflict in Syria has also been a major factor in steering Turkish-Kurdish relations as well. A central political party for Syrian Kurds, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), is a close collaborator with the PKK. PYD leader Salih Muslim has said that progress on the Kurdish issue in Turkey would gain the support of Syria’s Kurds and that they would also seek to open dialogue with the Turkish government themselves. The PYD has taken over territory vacated by retreating government forces, and as this new level of autonomy could encourage cross-border attacks, the Kurds will be a critical ally whatever the outcome of the war may be. Should bilateral relations between Syria and Turkey remain tense, the geographic position of Syria’s Kurdish population would act as a buffer between the two countries. Having the support of the PYD in a post-Assad government (which the main opposition group has promised will be inclusive) would afford Turkey an additional arm of influence in Syria’s future.

For all his successes in the peace process, building infrastructure, and leading the Turkish nation to relative prosperity, these riots clearly show that Erdogan is earning the increasing wrath of the secular youth and others. Erdogan’s rule must be reformed. But the process towards peace with the Kurds should not get lost in this revolt against Erdogan’s hubris– and it’s not only the Kurds and the Turkish people that have something at stake. Kurdish rights within Turkey will not only enhance domestic peace and security, they will also enable Turkey to reassert itself as a Middle Eastern power. Turkey’s strengthening ties with its Kurdish population can extend to relations with Kurds throughout the region. Greater regional influence of Turkey is critical towards the sustaining of democracy and stability in the Middle East, and by extension, security throughout the globe.