by Meghan Koushik
Afghan history brings to life George Santayana’s maxim: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” For the last two centuries the nation has witnessed a stream of failed occupations by foreign invaders who have consistently demonstrated learning nothing from the mistakes of their predecessors. In fact, the United States’ situation today mirrors the 1979–89 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Neither power understood the strength of ethnic factionalism in Afghanistan, and both underestimated the social backlash generated by their attempts to modernize the country.
By the late 1980s, the USSR’s exit strategy resembled America’s today: withdrawing, but leaving behind a self-sufficient government in Kabul, with a functioning army to assert its authority. Afghanistan is remembered as the Soviet Vietnam, with a humiliating Soviet defeat followed by civil war between ethnic factions. However, even after the Soviets withdrew, President Mohammad Najibullah’s government managed to hold onto power for three years, defying global expectations. As the United States prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan after 12 years of protracted conflict, the successes and failures of the Soviet campaign provide the Obama administration with key insights to manage the operation.
Unlike the current U.S. government that has consistently balked at providing a fixed date for military withdrawal, the Soviets made it eminently clear they were leaving. In 1987, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev established a two-year exit strategy and denied Najibullah’s government additional military assistance past February 15 of that year. This move forced the Najibullah government to take responsibility for “Afghanizing” national institutions — that is, transferring control of day-to-day responsibilities, civilian and military, from Soviet to Afghan officials. A similar fixed date from the American coalition would serve to pressure the Karzai government into taking responsibility for governing the country.
Foreign aid can also make a crucial contribution to Afghanistan’s stability. Soviet post-withdrawal support is largely credited with saving Najibullah’s regime from immediate collapse, though it ultimately could not ensure its survival in the long run. Afghanistan received military equipment, food and advisory assistance until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This gave Najibullah’s forces a tactical advantage over mujahideen fighters and allowed the government to buy off rival factions through an extensive patronage network. Patronage networks have long been a traditional means of power consolidation in Afghanistan; they allow tribal leaders to run economic matters and form militias within their region. The results were mixed. Much of Najibullah’s military support came from independent militias such as the Uzbek faction led by Abdul Rashid Dostum, which formed the 53rd infantry division of the Afghan army — but as soon as Soviet aid dried up, rival factions succeeded in combining strengths to take Kabul and then fell into ethnic tensions and civil strife.
As of January 2013, France, Canada and the Netherlands have withdrawn their combat missions from Afghanistan. Britain and America are expected to withdraw most troops by mid-2014, which has raised concerns that the foreign aid keeping Afghanistan’s economy afloat will be drastically reduced. At present, the United States has only made a tenuous commitment to remain engaged in Afghanistan after 2014. In May 2012, the Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan reiterated the commitment of the United States and its NATO allies to the lofty goal of “helping to craft a democratic society, based on rule of law and good governance.” However, the scope of this commitment remains relatively vague, and Afghanistan’s capacity to prevent the Taliban’s return to power or deny their affiliated transnational terrorist groups a safe haven will prove impossible to maintain without American support.
The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), much like the mujahideen in the 1990s, is likely to collapse into ethnic in-fighting when American support vanishes. Though the ANSF currently assumes responsibility for 75 percent of military operations conducted in Afghanistan, it relies on the NATO coalition for intelligence, logistics and air support. The Obama administration’s plan calls for a cut in its annual funding from $6 billion to $4.1 billion after 2014. In real terms, this would require laying off 120,000 soldiers and policemen from the ANSF, which currently employs around 350,000 Afghans. Afghanistan’s young men are easily drawn to insurgent groups and narcotics traffickers, both of which provide higher salaries than does the armed service. Such a drastic reduction of Afghan security forces would only exacerbate the country’s security issues. Given the recent turmoil over fiscal prudence in American economic policy, these budget cuts might seem necessary. But in the context of a $3.8 trillion U.S. budget, a mere $2 billion in savings is far likelier to make a substantial difference on the ground in Afghanistan than it is to ease domestic budgetary woes.
Equally important to securing aid is knowing where to direct it. The Soviets were highly successful at promoting development in urban areas like Kabul, but they lacked the resources and the foresight to extend this strategy to rural areas. Because of this, the mujahideen were able to build a power base in rural Afghanistan by relying on local people as a source of new fighters and hideouts. Najiibullah’s weakening grip on urban Afghanistan as aid faltered, coupled with a strengthening mujahideen presence in rural Afghanistan, eventually led to the loss of urban areas to mujahideen commanders. The same dynamic is taking place today: the vast majority of developmental aid and investments in infrastructure are funneled to urban centers like Herat and Kabul, while rural regions like the Helmand province are left to the mercy of pro-Taliban groups. The insurgency is once again rooted strongly in rural Afghanistan, bolstered by a flourishing opium trade and loyalty from rural populations dismayed by the government’s neglect and the lack of economic opportunities. Given that support for the insurgency often develops in a vacuum of government social services, the best way to “win hearts and minds” is through a strong governmental commitment to improve the quality of life for rural Afghans.
As the USSR would learn, nothing ever survives in Kabul without Islamabad’s approval. The influence of Afghanistan’s eastern neighbor is often overlooked in popular discourse but remains as salient today as it did in 1989. Pakistan’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) has routinely funneled arms and money to Islamic extremist groups in both India and Afghanistan over the past few decades. Islamabad’s support for the insurgency, in turn, results from Pakistan’s contentious relationship with India. Pakistan fears finding itself sandwiched between its eastern neighbor and an Afghanistan aligned with Delhi, which remains a leading aid donor to the Karzai government. Pakistan has sought to destabilize India with the covert funding of terror and has maintained close relationships with friendly strategic partners in Afghanistan to ensure that its influence over Afghan politics endures. Pakistan was one of the few nations to recognize and support Mullah Omar’s Taliban government throughout the mid-to-late 1990s. Since 9/11, Pakistan’s continued support for the Afghan insurgency has proved deeply detrimental to American interests in the region. The notorious Haqqani networks and Mullah Omar’s Shura Taliban continue to operate openly within Pakistani borders. In the wake of the raid that killed al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden, the Obama administration cut $800 million in American military aid to Pakistan. However, the administration has not closed off the possibility of restoring this aid, and in the 2013 fiscal year it budgeted roughly $2 billion in federal aid to Pakistan. Unlike the USSR, the United States has the capacity to influence Islamabad’s actions by cutting off aid.
The Soviet Union failed to ensure that aid was effectively disbursed on sustainable mechanisms for state stability, and after 1991 it abandoned its commitment to Afghanistan. Najibullah’s reign ended in his public execution and the disintegration of the nation into civil war. But the Soviet’s strategy between 1989 and 1991 had successful aspects and can still provide a valuable road map for America. It clearly demonstrates that troops can — and should — leave immediately. It also indicates that America must remain committed to managing strategic regional relationships and harnessing developmental aid to improve the quality of life for ordinary Afghans, who have suffered the most during the past decade. Should the United States fail in its commitment to Afghanistan’s long-term stability, the country will fall prey to the same civil strife it suffered throughout the 1990s. The United States must learn from history, or be condemned to repeat it.
Meghan Koushik ’13 is an International Relations and Middle East Studies concentrator.
Art by Katrina Machado