The opposition in Syria has reached a crossroads.
Contrary to popular belief (and the depressing coverage favored by most Western media), not everything looks black for the rebels trying to overthrow Assad – or at least for the Syrian National Coalition, the only opposition group that has achieved foreign recognition. Several weeks ago, the emir of Qatar expanded his support for the SNC from mainly financial assistance to a definite political leg-up by inviting its leader, Moaz al-Khatib, to take Syria’s seat in an Arab League summit. Syria’s membership was suspended in late 2011 in an act of protest against Assad’s human rights abuses, and the choice of the SNC to replace Assad therefore represents their increasing legitimacy as an alternative to his regime in general.
This is not to discount the violent attacks and refugee displacement in the region. The recent massacre in southern Syria, attributed to regime forces, is a stark reminder that conditions for Syrian citizens have reached terrifying proportions that are quickly drying up UN funding for such humanitarian crises. But the SNC’s political recognition is a step in the right direction.
So that’s the silver lining – but now for the cloud. Several days ago, Syrian rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra merged with the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), an umbrella organization that represents several Iraqi insurgent groups, including Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Al-Nusra’s participation in the anti-Assad effort has long worried the opposition’s supporters (the group allegedly receives funding from AQI to pursue Islamist objectives in Syria, which caused the United States to designate it as a terrorist organization several months ago), their prowess in battle appeared to make up for it. Regardless of their ulterior motives or their underhanded methods or the identity of their bankrollers, al-Nusra’s military tactics have proven extremely successful in fighting the Assad regime. But now that they’ve officially hooked up with ISI (the two even have a flag together), will their position as the dangerous but necessary hanger-on change?
To be perfectly honest, I am writing this post partly in an attempt to clarify the nature of al-Nusra’s new affiliation, which I believe has been widely misrepresented in the past couple days by the media. Al-Nusra is not merging with Al Qaeda, nor even with AQI (which is itself separate from Al Qaeda) – it is merging with ISI, which includes AQI (i.e. allows it to be associated with ISI’s giant scary conglomerate of Iraqi insurgents). In other words, al-Nusra is now related to AQI in that both of them are subsidiaries of ISI. But ISI also claims that since the official merger, ‘the two groups are now combined under the joint name of “the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria”‘ …and Ron would like me to tell you that Seamus told him that Dean was told by Parvati that Hagrid’s looking for you.
For Pete’s sake. I hate to say it, but Bin Laden was right.
Just hear me out. Not about his whole “America is the devil” philosophy, nor 9/11, nor any decision he ever made in his life, really. But for a while before his death at the hands of SEAL Team 6, Bin Laden had been worrying about Al Qaeda becoming a “tarnished brand.” Now, I know what you’re thinking, but no – Bin Laden wasn’t just being a total hipster. He believed that due to the increasing number of insurgent groups affiliated with Al Qaeda, there was a lack of organizational oversight. This resulted in political and operational blunders that caused the deaths of hundreds of Muslim civilians, which damaged Muslims’ trust in Al Qaeda. Essentially, bin Laden thought the new affiliates were causing Al Qaeda to stray from its founding purpose: to fight in the name of Islam. He wanted to rebrand his group and bring it back to its original mission – though he was taken out by Jessica Chastain before he could do so.
Bin Laden’s logic pertains to the current developments in al-Nusra’s situation in that it indicates a connection between expanding an insurgent group’s network of affiliates and the group losing sight of its original mission. For starters, the nature of al-Nusra’s new partnership is confusing, and therefore dangerous. In recent coverage, Al-Nusra has been closely associated with Al Qaeda and portrayed as its puppet in Syria. This connection has worried the Syrian people and their foreign supporters, and provided fodder for Assad, who has long cited the connection between the opposition and terrorist groups as justification for his suppressing them. But as explained above, the new relationship is more complex than that. And furthermore, since ISI’s announcement of the alleged merger, al-Nusra has downplayed it, asserting that among other things, it will retain its name and not assimilate into the “Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria,” as claimed by ISI. Overall, the messiness of this new affiliation is damaging al-Nusra in the eyes of both its supporters and its detractors.
And that’s just what the hype is doing; the realities of the ISI-al-Nusra partnership will have even more ominous effects for the opposition in Syria. The merger is already causing friction with other prominent Syrian opposition groups, which fear the organization’s extremist tactics and ideology. AQI and ISI are dangerous insurgent groups who continuously terrorize the Iraqi population, most recently in a series of deadly bomb attacks in Baghdad marking the 10th anniversary of the US declaration of war. And their role in the Arab uprisings so far has been worrying; in Egypt two years ago, ISI encouraged protestors to take advantage of the new “market of jihad” and to ignore the “deceiving ways” of secularism and democracy. And due to the known dangerous character of these groups, foreign supporters of the Syrian opposition are also wary of the new connection. Iraqi parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi recently weighed in on al-Nusra’s role in Syria, claiming that “the rise of extremism” will “delay the final outcome in Syria and halt aid to the Syrian people.” And the Obama administration has indicated that it will only provide aid that facilitates a political solution, which it believes is the only thing that will temper the influence of extremists and end the conflict.
The way I see it, how al-Nusra acts in the aftermath of this ill-conceived “merger” could make or break the opposition’s chances against Assad. By affiliating itself with these insurgent groups, al-Nusra is opening itself up to their methods and means of implementing them. Though initially it may have simply been pursuing Islamist objectives, its deepening connection with such organizations may cause it to become more extremist, and depart from its original mission (as bin Laden feared was the case with Al Qaeda). The distinction between Islamism and extremism is often confused. Establishing a state governed by the principles of Islam is not inherently evil. Governance takes many forms and there are times when Islamism is a fair and effective set of principles, and is the right answer – but not in the way it is currently manifesting itself in Syria, which seems destined to prolong and worsen the already horrible conflict. Certain positive developments, namely the steps toward political recognition discussed above, bode well for the Syrian opposition against Assad. But al-Nusra holds that success in its hands: and if this group does not temper the influence of its new affiliates, the recent gains may prove futile.