It seems absurd to claim that any country in a region as unstable as the Middle East/North Africa could be stagnant – but if any of them fit the bill, it would be Lebanon. Despite its seemingly volatile political situation (exemplified by constantly shifting party alliances and the numerous armed conflicts involving Israel and Syria), Lebanon has remained virtually in the same place since the end of the French occupation during World War II. Governmental positions are still allocated according to religious sect, parliamentary representation is based on a population census last taken in 1932, and the only coherent efforts to bring any change to this system are doomed to bring about even more gridlock and sectarian strife. Furthermore, though Lebanon is constantly forced to be a proxy battleground on which the long-running tensions between Israel and Iran are played out, there have been no significant regime changes or foreign policy shifts in decades.
To top it all off, there are no resentful masses or angry protestors in Lebanon to rival those elsewhere in the region. In fact, the attitude of the Lebanese people is characterized by complete resignation to (and even pride in) the convoluted nature of their political culture. It is a sort of head-shaking acceptance of the fact that Lebanon has unique and deeply-rooted issues that might never be solved — and a shoulder-shrugging readiness to enjoy themselves thoroughly in spite of it (“Keep Calm and Carry On” infused with “YOLO”, if you will). So the question is, what would it take to shift the institutionalized snafu that is daily life in Lebanon?
Until recently, the prospects for change in the near (or distant) future looked bleak. Even with the ever-escalating violence in Syria, it seemed unlikely that anything short of a dramatic overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (and the chaotic power vacuum that would ensue) could change even a stitch in the fabric of Lebanese society. But it has become increasingly apparent in recent weeks that it is not only the political developments in Syria that should be watched, but their socioeconomic effects — namely, the influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon and other states in the Levant.
Everyone has seen the statistics — according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), there are currently upwards of 300,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and the number is increasing by the hundreds and even thousands every day. And everyone has read the testimonials — the women and children who trek for miles across dangerous desert roads to reach border crossings, the large families who are forced to share cramped, makeshift living quarters, and even tales of bomb attacks on refugees. The message couldn’t be clearer: Syrians fleeing the violence between government and opposition forces face horrendous conditions, even after they leave their war-torn country. But the side of the coin that, until recently, did not receive as much media attention is the increasingly serious effect this mass exodus is having on the neighboring states that have to accomodate the refugees — particularly Lebanon.
Essentially, the presence of a large number of Syrians in the country could exacerbate what is already Lebanon’s biggest problem: sectarian tension. The majority of the Syrians entering the country are Sunni Muslims, which shouldn’t be an issue (despite the fact that the Lebanese government is currently controlled by the Shi’a Muslim party Hezbollah) because Sunnis already make up between a quarter and a third of the population. The potential for conflict, however, arises from the geographical segregation of sects in Lebanon, as well as the sheer number of Syrians. Sunni communities are concentrated in certain areas (namely Tripoli, the northern coast, and certain parts of the Bekaa Valley in the south), which were the first resort of Syrians emigrating to Lebanon. But these communities simply don’t have the resources to support the needs of all the refugees, who are being forced to spill over into Christian and Shi’a areas in Beirut and southern districts, which are Hezbollah strongholds. Though aid organizations may still be providing assistance to Syrians aid in these areas, the help is given only reluctantly and may decrease going forward – and here’s why.
The fact of the matter is, the Syrians are unwelcome in these areas both politically and economically. Politically, their biggest problem is Hezbollah. This party, which is not only in control of the ruling coalition in the Lebanese government but is also a major social welfare provider in Lebanon, is firmly allied with the Assad regime. For this reason, aid has been slow in coming, not only from Hezbollah-dominated areas but from the national government itself. The UN has advised that in order to provide better aid to the Syrians, the Lebanese government must set up formal refugee camps like those that already exist in Jordan and Turkey. However, this subject is a sore one for the Lebanese and particularly Hezbollah, given their past experiences. Decades ago, thousands of Palestinian refugees fled from the Israeli occupation into Lebanon and are still living there today in established camps. This deep-seated resentment of formal refugee camps, in addition to the dominant coalition’s loyalty to Assad, will cause an increase in political sectarianism if such camps are indeed established.
If the issue of camps is still too sensitive for the Lebanese, it seems only logical that the Syrians should forge their paths as refugees in another way: by assimilating into Lebanese society. But if this is allowed to happen, the Lebanese people will suffer the economic ramifications of a sudden workforce influx. The increased competition for jobs and resources (in an economy with an already skyrocketing unemployment rate) will not only economically disenfranchise the Lebanese, but foster even more resentment between them and the refugees, particularly in Shi’a areas already tense over the arrival of the Sunni Syrians.
The bottom line is that when it comes to Lebanon’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis, there is no easy solution — on top of the hostility arising from general institutionalized Lebanese sectarianism, the establishment of refugee camps will inflame religious tensions and social assimilation will hurt everyone involved economically. It all comes down to this: Lebanon, for years resentful of the looming presence of Syria over its shoulder, is being affected by its troublesome neighbor in an even deeper way than ever before. The aforementioned fabric of its society may not only fray, but start to rip. And so comes the inevitable question: what, if anything, is to be done? The question of military intervention has been null and void for awhile now, but surely humanitarian aid is still a possibility, for the good of both the Syrian refugees and their Lebanese hosts. For God’s sake, if even Israel is able and willing to provide better healthcare for Syrian refugees than Lebanon, surely others can step in and help the Syrians and the Lebanese before this mutually destructive relationship reaches a breaking point. Britain seems to be heading in the right direction — in a visit to Lebanon last week, British Foreign Secretary William Hague not only pledged millions of dollars to assist various Lebanese civil society groups in their aid efforts, but emphasized “setting out an enhanced offer of support for Lebanon’s stability.” Ultimately, the plight of these refugees cannot be treated as an isolated humanitarian crisis. As horrific as the conditions faced by the Syrians are, they are inextricably connected to socioeconomic issues in neighboring states. If they are not addressed on a more sensitive and comprehensive scale, then massive socioeconomic changes may be in store for countries like Lebanon. And if there’s anything I’ve learned from studying and spending time there, it’s that as complicated and tense as things look for the Lebanese now, they can always get worse.